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Introduction 
Within memory studies there has been a gradual move away from the dichotomous divide 
between individual and collective memory, with work emerging arguing for the 
importance of acknowledging the interrelations between self and other in processes of 
remembering. This strand of research, captured within this special issue, conceptualizes 
remembering as an active process of construction, influenced by the context in which it 
takes place. Much of this work builds on the ground breaking work by Bartlett in the 
early 20
th
 century (Wagoner, this issue), but also as a reaction to literature that continues 
to separate the cognition of individuals from the socio-cultural setting in which it occurs.  
 
At this intersection between the individual, the social and the context, remembering 
becomes a process further shaped by the underlying power dynamics that lend authority, 
credibility and ‘truth’ to specific version of both individual and collective memory. 
Particularly, we see this occurring in contexts of clear power asymmetries, where 
memory becomes constructed in reaction to the situational definition developed by the 
more dominant party (Brown & Reavey, this issue). Processes of remembering are thus 
not mere retrievals of existing information, but a negotiation, construction and at times, 
manipulation, of what is assumed to have occurred in the past.  
 
This short commentary will explore the role of power in processes of remembering. It 
will do so by first considering what we mean by constructive memory, particularly 
drawing on Bartlett’s conceptualization. Secondly, the extent to which power has been 
considered in memory studies is discussed, arguing that this interrelationship is best 
captured within collective memory studies, particularly in politicized contexts. Following 
on from this, we explore how power-relations permeate three articles within this special 
issue (Brockmeier; Brown & Reavey and Wagoner). While power is not an explicitly 
prominent feature of these articles, an analysis of them through this lens can offer new 
insights into how the construction and reconstruction of events, aesthetic objects, and 
scientific theories become shaped by the dominant socio-cultural movements and power-
asymmetries between individuals, but also groups and cultures. The paper concludes with 
a discussion about the benefits of explicitly acknowledging the power-relations present in 
process of collective remembering and the implications that this has for how we 
understand what becomes remembered and how.  
 
Constructive Memory and its ‘Flaws’  
According to Wagoner (this issue), studies on remembering which accept the constructed 
nature of memory, have tended to assume that this implies memory to be ‘flawed’, as 
inaccuracy becomes characteristic of it. This is particularly evident in studies of ‘false 
memory’, a field discussed and criticized by Brown and Reavey (this issue). Wagoner 
argues that a second conceptualization of constructive memory exists, which lies closer to 
the original ideas of Bartlett from the early 20
th
 century. Namely, by considering 
remembering as an active process of (re)construction, it offers memory a positive 
strength as it allows it to be flexible and future-oriented, adapting to new needs in an 
ever-changing world. This latter understanding of memory focuses less on the extent to 
which memories are ‘true’ or ‘false’, but rather on the importance in connecting the past 
with the present and the future. This was an important point that Bruner (1990) wished to 
add to Bartlett’s account of memory, by developing further how narratives shape 
processes or recall and remembering. Bruner argued that Bartlett’s reproduction 
experiments of the Native American folk tale, War of the Ghosts, became culturally 
conventionalized by participants in order for them to make sense not only to the 
participants themselves, but also for those assumed to be listening. Bruner thus argued 
that there was a dialogical function of recalling a past or retelling a story, in that 
remembering becomes an activity shaped by the interrelations between teller and listener, 
researcher and participants, or individual and collective. Wagoner illustrates this 
dialogical aspect of memory by mapping the ways in which the meaning of Bartlett’s 
work itself has changed over time, becoming shaped by the interaction between an 
individual’s background, the dominant socio-cultural trends of the time and other 
important social influences.  
 
Before discussing this paper in more detail, it is important to consider the extent to which 
power has actually been part of research on memory studies, and the insights this has had 
to offer us so far.  
 
Power in Memory Studies 
Much work acknowledging the role of power in shaping what is remembered and how 
comes from the field of political psychology, peace psychology and intergroup conflict 
studies (Bar-Tal, 2011; Leone & Mastrovito, 2010; Nicholson, 2016). These fields have 
explored the ways in which hegemonic representations of the past become part of 
reproducing and keeping alive hostile intergroup relations (Paez & Liu, 2011), how 
stigmatized pasts become re-imagined in order to serve protective identity functions 
(Obradović, 2016), and how institutions become part of shaping these memory processes 
by legitimizing specific versions of the past (Podeh, 2002; van Ommering, 2015). This 
literature shows clearly what is at stake in processes of remembering, and the power one 
holds by being able to shape the ways in which the past is understood.  
 
Research on collective continuity demonstrates the importance of linking the past, present 
and future in order to feel a sense of coherence, stability and collective belonging (Sani, 
Bowe, Herrera, manna, Cossa, Miao & Zhou, 2007; Sani, 2010). These studies have 
demonstrated the interconnectedness between memory, identity, public commemorations 
of events and the ways in which groups, nationals, and even continents choose to 
remember history. In particular, cross-cultural research by Liu and colleagues (Liu, Paez, 
Slawuta, Cabecinhas, Techio, Kokdermir et al., 2009; Cabercinhas, Liu, Klein, Mendes, 
Feijo and Niyubabwe, 2011) on representations of world history demonstrate the extent 
to which dominant nations and cultures, also become dominant actors and points of 
reference in memories of world history, even in less ‘globally’ dominant cultures.  
Certain countries thus hold the power to shape what is globally considered important to 
remember, but also what model of the nation and ideology considered acceptable. As 
Molden (2016) argues “after 1989, it has become all but outrageous to argue, in 
mainstream media and discourse, outside the paradigm of market liberalism, as 
alternatives (communism, socialism) have been proclaimed historical errors that failed to 
survive the evolutionary competition of ideas.” (p.126). Thus, the ways in which we 
remember the past suggests a specific version of the present which is considered 
legitimate, just and ‘right’.  
 
Another strand of research, while not within collective memory studies, has explored how 
power and the power-positions of specific social identities shape discourses and what can 
be said by whom (Duveen, 2001; Gillespie & Cornish, 2010; Linell, 2009, chapter 9; 
Psaltis & Duveen, 2007). As Gillespie & Cornish note, in an experimental setting, 
asymmetrical power relations in dialogue constrain not only what the subordinate say, but 
also what the dominant hears and accepts as ‘real’. We see the importance of power-
relations in dialogue and interaction in Brown and Reavey’s paper, particularly in their 
discussion of the police interrogation of Brendan Dassey (from the documentary Making 
a Murderer) but also in the power-dynamics between researcher-subject and parent-child. 
As will be discussed shortly, it is important to consider the ways in which language, both 
in how we talk about remembering within memory studies, as well as how discourses 
become sites of power-struggles in memory negotiation in everyday life situations.  
 
While it may seem logical that power has taken a larger role in context of politics and 
collective memory, studies of cultural psychology would nonetheless equally benefit 
from acknowledging the importance of whose version of an event, person, or conflict, is 
accepted and reproduced. While perhaps less explicitly, the papers by Wagoner, 
Brockmeier and Brown and Reavey in this special issue do address the role of power in 
shaping how we (re)construct individual memories, scientific theories and works of art. 
The following two sections will discuss how.  
 
Language, Collective Memory and Power 
As Brown and Reavey (this issue) argue, the language around memory, particularly the 
use of ‘true’ and ‘false’ memory becomes problematic as it conceptualizes memory not as 
a process of social construction, but an objective reality ‘out there’ to be uncovered. The 
dichotomy of true and false memory is rejected by the authors, and instead they argue for 
the need to consider the ‘setting-specificity’ of remembering, where “memory is 
approached as a property of jointly-managed activities that occur in a definite time and 
place, and which have their own distinct norms and procedures as to what constitutes 
‘truth’ and ‘falsity’.” (xx). By considering memory as contextually sensitive, and 
remembering as a reconstructive process, the authors echo Bartlett’s argument in 
Remembering (1932), and recognize the social influences that come to shape even the 
most individual memories, such as a balloon ride experienced as a child (which while 
‘remembered’, never actually took place).  By emphasizing the setting-specificity of 
remembering, the authors also acknowledge that “the power to manage and control the 
situation clearly lies with the institution and its representative (i.e. investigators, 
reporters, experimenters) in a way that is tangible to the participants.” (p.xx). We find 
traces of this type of argument in Bartlett’s work as well, particularly in his discussion on 
‘tendencies’ (Bartlett, 1923). When discussing social relationship tendencies, Bartlett 
includes within this category both dominance and submissiveness. As Wagoner (2017, 
p.11) explains “When there is asymmetry of power 
and status in a social relationship, the higher status individual or group takes on 
the dominance or assertive tendency, while the lower status actor takes on the 
submissive tendency. The dominant actor has influence through command and by 
making an impression on the other rather than being an expression of their way 
of thinking.”  
 
Brown & Reavey’s article is a clear illustration of how this occurs. As the authors show, 
in contexts of police interrogations, childhood memories or accusations of sexual assault 
against famous individuals, those in positions of power and influence are also those who 
are able to specify the setting of remembering, and thus control what is remembered and 
how. As discussed in relation to collective memory studies within inter-group conflict 
contexts, having the power to get one’s version to become taken-for-granted, it comes as 
close to being ‘true’ as possible. This in and of itself is a huge accomplishment.  
Perhaps the case of Brendan Dassey becomes the most telling of this. Known from the 
documentary Making a Murderer, the young teenager is featured in the documentary 
when he is taken into custody and questioned at length for his involvement in the murder 
of a woman named Teresa Halbach. Throughout the interrogation, Brendan’s memory is 
scaffolded by police officers asking questions of confirmatory nature, construction one 
version of the past which is clearly contradicted by the version he tells his mother later on 
in the documentary. Brown and Reavey, using this example among others, illustrate how 
problematic is becomes to classify memory as ‘true’ or ‘false’, and the extent to which 
the field of false memory studies accomplishes what is sets out to do.  
 
As the paper shows, false memory studies give us little guidance in how to improve 
confidence in memory and aiding vulnerable individuals through the process of 
recollection. Instead, the constructive nature of memory has made memory flawed, 
leading to scepticism towards individual recall. This in turn has implications for how 
individuals are treated in settings where institutions or authorities have the power to set 
the framework in which remembering occurs. These can thus become part not of 
protecting and safeguarding individuals in vulnerable and victimized situations, but rather 
abusing their power-position to shape what these individuals remember to be ‘true’. We 
must therefore unearth and make explicit the power-asymmetries present in processes of 
remembering, moving away from the assumption that ‘false’ memories are due to the 
inherent lack of individual cognitive abilities, and more the outcome of the malleability, 
and at times manipulation, of the dialogical activity of remembering.  
 
Power in the Sciences and Arts  
The importance of power is not limited to child-adult, individual-authority relations, but 
rather it also infiltrates larger, social processes of remembering. As Wagoner (this issue) 
shows, even scientific theories are not safeguarded from the constructive and context-
specific nature of memory, but rather, their movement over history and time becomes 
shaped by the larger dominant trends within the science itself.  
 
Focusing on the work of Bartlett, Wagoner asks the question “how did we get from one 
meaning of constructive to another?” and provides the answer by charting the 
(re)construction of Bartlett’s ideas and concepts over the last century. In doing so, 
Wagoner offers a detailed and extensive account of research reproducing Bartlett’s work 
on remembering, and the different turns these accounts have taken. Strikingly, the paper 
demonstrates how dominant movements within the field of psychology itself shaped the 
processes of (re)construction and even led to the replacement of his original concepts 
with concepts more suitably situated within the larger, dominant turn of psychology at the 
time.  
 
Thus, here we see power working on a more subtle level via social influences, but also 
leading paradigms. Bartlett acknowledged the importance of social influences by 
considering construction as related to meaning-making taking place within a framework 
of familiarity, or common sense. In other words, remembering is always shaped by the 
social, cultural and ideological ideas dominant within the context in which the individual 
lives. Thus, the assimilation of Bartlett’s experiments within the familiar social, cultural 
and political backgrounds of researchers was anticipated by the theoretical work itself.  
 
However, this process should not be assumed to occur as an accumulation, where new 
meaning is only added to pre-existing, unchanging knowledge and memories. Rather, 
remembering should be understood as a transformative process. As Wagoner writes in 
regards to Bartlett’s theorization about the constructive nature of remembering,  “[w]hile 
the first notion of ‘constructive’ highlights the flexible adaptation of a past standard to the 
present, the second more radical notion of construction was used by Bartlett to describe 
the process of welding together elements from divergent sources into a new form.” (p. 
xx). Perhaps Brockmeier’s paper (this issue) on Picasso’s art shows best the ways in 
which the latter conceptualization of construction occurs in a real world context.  
 
Brockmeier uses the work of Picasso as a case study to consider the interplay between 
individual and collective memory. However, even more revealing in the article is the 
power of Picasso to introduce and integrate African masks, and thus African culture, into 
the Western arts. Similarly to Brown and Reavey, as well as Wagoner, Brockmeier 
considered remembering (and forgetting) as a practice embedded within a larger social 
and cultural context, rejecting the assumption that individual memory is separated from 
its collective counterpart. Focusing in on Picasso and his art, Brockmeier demonstrates 
the benefits to taking a sociocultural approach to remembering. The approach emphasizes 
three important components of remembering; 1) mnemonic artefacts, 2) systems of signs 
and symbols and 3) the interconnections between individual and social/cultural memory.  
 
Focusing in on Picasso and his famous Les Demoiselles d’Avignon (The young ladies of 
Avignon), Brockmeier illustrates how power, within the larger backdrop of colonialism 
and global domination, enabled Picasso to introduce African culture and tradition into the 
Western art scene. As Brockmeier argues, “[w]hile he gave centre stage to African art 
and promoted tribal masks to enigmatic artworks, this came at a price: the masks became 
famous as icons of Western art, not African art. Before and outside of this 
implementation they were ‘primitive’ and certainly not considered as significant artefacts 
within their own indigenous cultural traditions.” (p.xx). Returning again to Bartlett, we 
see the constructive process of remembering as the fusion of diverse elements, traditions 
and culture to create something new and innovative.  However, while artists previously 
had fused Western and non-Western symbols within their work it was the influential 
social and cultural position of Picasso that opened up the stage for the inclusion of non-
Western symbols within Western art. Thus, while ‘constructive’ processes occur 
constantly, it is social influence and power which will determine which one’s are 
remembered on a larger, collective scale.  
 
Situating Picasso’s work within the larger, global context, Brockmeier points out that the 
criticality towards Picasso and ‘his’ masks changed in the wake of postcolonialism, 
moving from a perspective of colonial theft and cultural exploitation to a consideration of 
Picasso’s art as an act of recognition of another culture. Thus, we can see the attempt by 
non-Western artists to ‘reclaim’ the Picasso’s masks as African masks, considering 
Picasso’s work as praising, rather than dominating, the ‘Africaness’ inherent in Les 
Demoiselles d’Avignon.  
 
The Power of Remembering 
This short commentary has explored the role of power in shaping what is remembered 
and how, particularly in contexts of socio-cultural psychology, where this intersection has 
been less explored. The papers in this section were discussed, considering the ways in 
which power-asymmetries on both the interpersonal, but also national and global level, 
allow for certain memories to become more prevalent and accepted as ‘truth’. However, 
as Brown and Reavey point out, the language around remembering which distinguishes 
between ‘true’ and ‘false’ memories can become detrimental as it moves away from 
considering constructive memory as adaptive and a consequence of flexible human 
cognition, to considering memories as inherently flawed and prone to inaccuracy. As this 
commentary has showed, it is often power-relations which come into play to shape what 
memories are considered more legitimate than others, and thus inaccuracy might not 
always be a flaw of individual memories, but rather lack of ability, influence or power to 
get one’s memories heard and accepted.  
 
Finally then, it is perhaps worthwhile to take a critical approach to memory, unearthing 
the power-relations that underlie the process of remembering as it occurs at the 
intersection between self, other and the object of memory. A potential way of doing so is 
by considering more openly and critically the socio-cultural context in which 
remembering occurs. Who is doing the remembering and for what purpose? Who is the 
listener, or audience, of this act of remembering, and what is their role? Finally, what are 
the implications that come with one version of remembering over another? Asking these 
questions, even within contexts of socio-cultural studies of remembering can provide a 
starting-point for more explicitly acknowledging how power shapes memory.  
This in turn hopefully allows us to deal better with the scepticism felt towards individual 
recollections of events, particularly vulnerable individuals or recollections of traumatic 
occurrences. Together this will offer a better understand of the ways in which the context 
in which remembering occurs comes to shape memory itself.  
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